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¿Es obsoleto el bienestar del consumidor? Una perspectiva de la 
competencia en la Unión Europea
Resumen: en 2005, la Comisión Europea abogó por un enfoque más económico de la aplicación de las leyes de com-
petencia. El único criterio para evaluar la legalidad de una práctica de mercado debe ser la evaluación de sus efectos 
netos sobre el bienestar de los consumidores. El Tribunal de Justicia se mostró reacio a adoptar este enfoque hasta 
la sentencia de Intel de 2017. Su aprobación —que es discutible en la medida en que la sentencia puede dar lugar a 
diferentes interpretaciones— puede parecer paradójica en el medida en que es concomitante con un fuerte desafío 
al criterio del bienestar del consumidor en los Estados Unidos. La finalidad de este artículo es volver sobre la historia 
de este criterio, en particular en su adopción en el contexto de la ley de competencia de la ue. Nuestro objetivo es 
demostrar que las críticas al enfoque basado en los efectos pueden abordarse sin alejarse del criterio de bienestar 
del consumidor, sino integrándolo en una perspectiva más amplia que también tenga en cuenta la protección del 
propio proceso de competencia.
Palabras clave:  prácticas anticompetitivas; enfoque basado en los efectos; bienestar del consumidor; 
ordoliberalismo; derecho de la competencia de la Unión Europea
O bem-estar do consumidor se tornou obsoleto? Uma perspectiva de 
concorrência da União Europeia
Resumo: em 2005, a Comissão Europeia advogou por uma abordagem mais econômica da aplicação das leis de 
concorrência. O único critério para avaliar a legalidade de uma prática de mercado deve ser a avaliação de seus 
efeitos líquidos sobre o bem-estar dos consumidores. O Tribunal de Justiça se mostrou relutante a adotar essa 
abordagem até a sentença da Intel de 2017. Sua aprovação, que é discutível na medida em que a sentença pode dar 
espaço a diferentes interpretações, pode parecer paradoxal, visto que é concomitante com um forte desafio para o 
critério do bem-estar do consumidor nos Estados Unidos. O objetivo deste artigo é voltar à história desse critério, 
em particular sua adoção no contexto da lei de concorrência da União Europeia. Além disso, demonstrar que as 
críticas à abordagem baseada nos efeitos podem ser tratadas ao não nos afastarmos do critério de bem-estar do 
consumidor, mas sim integrando-o numa perspectiva mais ampla que também considere a proteção do próprio 
processo de concorrência.
Palavras-chave:  práticas anticoncorrenciais; abordagem baseada em efeitos; bem-estar do consumidor; 
ordoliberalismo; direito da concorrência da União Europeia
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As a cornerstone of European Union (hereafter 
eu) competition law enforcement since the (grad-
ual) adoption of the effects-based approach over 
the last 15 years, the consumer welfare criterion 
is paradoxically being challenged at the very mo-
ment when it seemed to be gaining ground. This 
contribution aims to put this dynamic of adoption 
into perspective with the history of eu competi-
tion case law and the history of economic thought.
We show how the debates surrounding the con-
centration of economic power in the United States 
(us) and its consequences on competition have 
led to a re-examination of the place of consumer 
welfare as the sole criterion for assessing compet-
itive practices. These considerations echo the now 
secular debates on the Sherman Act’s finality and 
the questions raised by 1930s neo-liberals on both 
sides of the Atlantic. It is a question of deciding 
between a competition policy that aims to secure 
the outcome of competition—allocative efficien-
cy— and a competition policy that aims to protect 
the competition process for its own sake.
This second option amounts de facto to up-
dating the European concept of the dominant 
operator’s special responsibility for preserving a 
situation of effective competition. Therefore, it is 
not a question of rejecting the criterion of consum-
er welfare but of reconciling objectives that may to 
some extent be incommensurable and sometimes 
contradictory: loyalty, fairness, preservation of 
market access... In the end, it is a matter of the 
judge’s role in applying the rule of law.
This article discusses the place of the consumer 
welfare criterion and its implementation in compe-
tition rules. The first section shows that it was only 
very belatedly integrated into the framework of 
eu competition law. The second section highlights 
that in the face of the challenges posed, particu-
larly in the us, the consumer welfare criterion re-
mains valid from the moment it is integrated into 
broader competitive reasoning, as implemented by 
the European Commission. Nevertheless, our con-
clusion reveals that such a reconciliation between 
potentially contradictory criteria may not go by 
itself. Our third and conclusive section discuss-
es the difficulties in implementing a competition 
protection standard and presents some arguments 
in defence of the total welfare criterion as an alter-
native to the consumer welfare one.
A gradual convergence of Eu 
competition law enforcement 
towards a more economic approach 
This first section highlights how European com-
petition authorities have gradually adopted con-
sumer welfare as the sole criterion for competition 
rules enforcement, even though the foundations 
for the construction of European competition pol-
icy are based on broader theoretical roots, partly 
derived from German ordoliberalism1.
The historic foundations of the Eu 
competition law 
In this section, we first investigate the history 
of competition laws to separate the us influence 
from the European roots of the eu competition 
policy before considering in a second subsection 
the concentration of markets in the current anti-
trust debate.
The European roots of Eu competition law 
Historically, the first competition laws were North 
American. The first competition laws enacted were, 
more precisely, Canadian2 in 1889 and us with 
the Sherman Act in 1890. Meanwhile, the protec-
tion of competition was all but satisfying in the 
European continent. For instance, in France, the 
sanction of cartels remained purely hypotheti-
cal for a long time. Although the 1810 Penal Code 
1  We will therefore assimilate the European 
approach and ordoliberalism in the rest of the 
article. The identification of the two is debata-
ble, but it intends to simplify the point. It would 
also be possible to use the concept of the Brussels 
School (see Hildebrand, 2012).
2  The Combines Investigation Act, extended to in-
clude mergers and monopolisation activities, and 




Revista Prolegómenos  ■  Vol. 24(47)
had provided legal tools to sanction cartels3, the 
courts, since the Restauration, had made a dis-
tinction between good and bad cartels, leading to 
non-enforcement (Didry & Marty, 2016). In Germa-
ny, the Reichsgericht (the Supreme Court) validat-
ed cartel arrangements in 1897 based on freedom 
of contract (Joliet, 1967). In the same decade, in the 
United Kingdom, the House of Lords, then sitting 
as a supreme court, in its Mogul Steamships deci-
sion (1892), acquiesced to “predatory” strategies as 
long as they benefit the consumer and appear to 
adhere to the principles of free competition4. Thus, 
before 1914, no legislation comparable to the Cana-
dian and us legislation existed in Europe. Gerber 
(1998) points out that some projects were neverthe-
less discussed in Austria-Hungary and Sweden on 
the eve of the First World War. However, these laws 
were not adopted.
Even worse, the experiences of the war economy 
caused large corporations and public authorities to 
consider inter-firm coordination, i.e., cartelisation, 
as an effective tool for steering the national econo-
my. In this regard, it is instructive to note that the 
German example strongly influenced the French 
government during the conflict itself. A reversal 
is thus taking place in the aftermath of the Great 
War. The pre-war period was shaped by prevailing 
classical liberalism. The laissez-faire appeared as 
the best approach in terms of economic policy. As 
in other government interventions, competition 
policy did not have a specific role to play unless 
3  Article 419 of the 1810 Penal Code stated, “All 
those who, by false or slanderous claims delibe-
rately sown in the public, by exaggerating offers 
at the prices demanded by the sellers themselves, 
by meetings or coalitions between the principal 
holders of the same merchandise or commodi-
ty, tend not to sell it, or to sell it only at a certain 
price, or all those who, by any fraudulent means 
or ways whatsoever, have raised or lowered the 
price of foodstuffs or goods or public papers and 
effects above or below the prices that would have 
been determined by natural and free competition 
in trade, shall be punished by imprisonment be-
tween one month and one year and a fine of five 
hundred to ten thousand francs.” 
4  Mogul Steamship Co. v Mc Gregor, Cow & Co, 23 
QBD 588.
contractual freedom and property rights were 
at stake. In this respect, the European practices 
were quite close to the us Classical Legal Thought 
prescriptions, which hindered the application of 
government interventions and antitrust rules en-
forcement in the Lochner era5.
By contrast, the inter-war period was charac-
terised by the defence of the cartel as an efficient 
way of organising the economy and avoiding de-
structive competition. This position was defended 
by some of the major industry captains (G. Swope 
in the us for ge, A. Detoeuf in France for Alsth-
om) and ultimately by the public authorities (see 
the Laval decree-laws of 1935 in the French case, 
for instance).
The sole exception on the European continent 
was Germany with the Weimar Republic 1923 
Competition Act. The most fundamental root 
of European competition law lies in assessing 
its failure to overcome the market power of large 
companies (Marty, 2015). Many legal scholars 
and economists who founded the Freiburg School 
(Freiburg im Breisgau) took part in the experience 
and concluded on the requirements for an effective 
competition policy. From this perspective, strong 
competition regulation is necessary to ensure the 
5  A double phenomenon characterised the Lochner 
era. Firstly, it entailed an under-enforcement of 
antitrust rules based on protection of proper-
ty rights and freedom of contract, this last one 
conceived as an approximation to individual 
liberty (Kirat & Marty, 2019). Secondly, it invol-
ved the enforcement of these same rules against 
trade unions (see Glick, 2019a). Glick illustrates 
this enforcement bias through the case of the Se-
cond Cleveland Administration from 1893 to 1897 
(the first one, from 1885 to 1889, was the first of 
the Democrat Party since the us Civil War). If the 
Cleveland Administration brought eight antitrust 
cases, four of them would target labour unions. 
The most striking case was us v Debs in 1894. 
Debs’ labour union boycotted Pullman railway 
cars in solidarity with striking workers at the 
Pullman Palace Car Co. He was sanctioned (and 
eventually jailed) as his position gave rise to an 
unlawful strike that interfered with mail deli-
very and interstate commerce (us Supreme Court, 
Debs In Re 158 us 564 (1895).
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competitive process itself against private econom-
ic powers. The government must not only act as a 
night watchdog, in the sense of 19th-century Man-
chesterian liberalism, but also as a government that 
actively intervenes to protect competition, includ-
ing against itself, as soon as its natural result is the 
concentration of economic power (Mongouachon, 
2011).
The Lippman Colloquium organised in Par-
is by Louis Rougier in 1938 was the focal point 
of this theoretical dynamic (Mirowski & Pleh-
we, 2009). This conference marked the birth of 
neo-liberalism and was at the foundation of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society (mps) after the war in 1947. 
Whether it was the Lippman Colloquium or the 
first conference of the mps, the different branch-
es of neo-liberalism were still present, namely the 
ordoliberals and what was to become, under the 
impetus of A. Director and E. Levi, the Second 
Chicago School (Bougette et al., 2015).
We will define the first approach, German or-
doliberalism, in this subsection and the second, 
the Chicago School neoliberalism, in the following 
subsection. Ordoliberalism is based on a set of as-
sumptions that are quite straightforward to define. 
First, two powers threaten the market process: 
governments, which may be tempted to instru-
mentalise (or neutralise) it, and private economic 
powers, which may be tempted to manipulate it 
for their benefit. Second, the market process is not 
seen as self-regulating. It can result in the concen-
tration of economic power and thus in its exhaus-
tion6. Third, government intervention is required 
to counteract this tendency, but this intervention 
must be “neutral.” It must therefore be based on 
quasi-constitutional rules and be impersonal so as 
not to be instrumentalised7. Fourth, the protection 
of competition through public interventions does 
6  On the opposite, according to Friedman (1962), 
private monopolies raise fewer concerns than pu-
blic ones as they are “generally unstable and of 
brief duration unless they can call government to 
their assistance” (p. 131)
7  The government may be captured by private eco-
nomic power, as the best guarantee against com-
petition are regulatory barriers to entry. See Zin-
gales (2017) for an analysis of these phenomena.
not aim to secure the actual outcome of competi-
tion (productive efficiency) but its process in itself 
and for itself.
The competitive process is conceived as a 
means of discovering and revealing the knowledge 
spread among the various players in the economy 
in the sense of Hayek (1945). Competition is also 
considered a tool for dispersing economic pow-
er. Competition is the mechanism for dispersing 
power in the market sphere, as democracy is the 
one for dispersing power in the political sphere 
(Marty & Kirat, 2018). The two dimensions are 
consubstantially combined in the ordoliberal ap-
proach: the defence of democracy and the defence 
of competition go along with each other.
The above leads to two specificities. First, com-
plete competition must be protected, which means 
a situation in which companies are price-takers, 
i.e., they do not have any market power8. Second, 
if an undertaking has such power, it must behave 
as if it did not. The notion of the dominant oper-
ator’ special responsibility in the decisional prac-
tice of the European Commission stems from this 
approach9. The notion of special responsibility is 
defined as follows in the eu jurisprudence: 
A finding that an undertaking has a dominant 
position is not in itself a recrimination but simply 
means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it 
has such a dominant position, the undertaking con-
cerned has a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition 
on the common market10. 
As we will see infra, it is more a matter of pro-
tecting the market process than securing allocati-
ve efficiency.
8  Such an approach considers that the best situation 
is the one of effective (and not a potential) rivalry 
on the markets preserving consumers’ freedom of 
choice (see Amato, 1997).
9  eu Court of Justice, 9 November 1983, C-322/81, 
NV Nederlandesche Banden Industrie Michelin 
c. Commission and 13 February 1979, Case 85/76, 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission.
10  General Court (Court of First Instance), 30 Sep-
tember 2003, Case T–203/01 Manufacture françai-
se des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission.
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However, the European competition policy 
should not be regarded as mechanically driven by 
ordoliberalism. Firstly, the second German com-
petition law was enacted in 1957, only after the 
Treaty of Rome. Secondly, other future Member 
States had their competition legislation before 
then. This was the case, for example, in France 
with the Commission Technique des Ententes cre-
ated in 1953, which is a distant predecessor of our 
contemporaneous French Competition Authority. 
Thirdly, the Treaty of Rome, which resulted from 
the Messina Convention and the Spaak Report, 
was a compromise11 between national attitudes 
more oriented towards competition (Federal Re-
public of Germany) and others more inclined to 
use industrial policies (France and Italy). Fourthly, 
the rise of DG Competition, in which the ordo-
liberal influence was from the outset the stron-
gest within the Commission (Vay, 2019), was only 
very gradual (Warlouzet, 2010). The implemen-
tation of Regulation 17/6212 was challenging, and 
most of the ordoliberal influence came through 
the decisional practice of the eu Court of Justice 
from the 1970s onwards. Its competition law-based 
judgments could be part of an integrationist pro-
cess in the sense of Gerber (1998): the aim is to 
build a unified internal market governed by the 
rules of free and undistorted competition.
Before addressing the following points, it is 
worth noting that the internal competition laws 
of the various eu Member States have adopted ex-
tensive objectives that go beyond the criterion of 
consumer welfare, which is never mentioned in 
the Treaty. Moreover, the competition laws of the 
various Member States are very composite in their 
structure. They encompass both restrictive prac-
tices law (competitor law) and antitrust law (market 
law). In doing so, the task of redressing the balance 
of economic power is never absent from competi-
tion law, as is the protection of the consumer and 
broader “non-economic” values (pluralism, among 
11  See Warlouzet (2008) for an in-depth analysis. 
12  eec Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 21 
February 1962.
others). As Roda (2018) clearly shows, competition 
law is designed to reconcile the different objectives 
assigned to market competition, which are by na-
ture conflicting.
The issue of Bigness: Should the 
competition laws protect a given market 
structure? 
The purpose of the eu decisional practice was to 
ensure a situation of effective competition. The 
aim was not to protect competitors, as it could be 
the case in a structuralist logic (à la Harvard), but 
to compel the dominant operator to check that its 
decisions will not have the effect (or are not likely 
to have the effect) of hindering competition on the 
relevant market. Therefore, the purpose is to pro-
tect competition not as regards its outcome but as 
regards its process.
This European perspective has conflicted in 
these two last decades with the approach devel-
oped by the second branch of neoliberalism, e.g., 
the Second Chicago School, since the 1950s. It is 
not a question, in this paper, of developing the gen-
esis of the latter (see, for instance, Bougette et al., 
2015) but of tracing some of its basic tenets.
First, this school is directly connected to the 
First School of Chicago, of which Henry Simons 
was the figurehead, yet it differs somewhat di-
ametrically from his positions. Simons was a 
neo-liberal who endorsed the very same advo-
cations as the ordoliberals. He was even more 
interventionist. He regarded the market as not 
self-regulating, as it was seen as inexorably con-
verging towards the concentration of economic 
power. According to Simons, such a tendency was 
a problem in itself, whether from an economic or 
political perspective. It is, therefore, a require-
ment to implement the antitrust rules resolutely. 
This enforcement can dismantle firms to make 
competition possible again. According to Simons, 
dismantling may be a necessary antitrust remedy 
whatever its cost in terms of efficiency (Kirat & 
Marty, 2019). The Second Chicago School will as-
sume the perfect opposite of these positions. Situ-
ations of overwhelming dominance are no longer 
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considered a problem, and the implementation of 
antitrust rules must be based on a single criteri-
on: efficiency13, regardless of any considerations 
related to the competitive structure on the rele-
vant market.
Second, the Second Chicago School refuses to 
consider certain practices as anticompetitive (ex-
cept for horizontal price cartels, below-cost preda-
tory strategies, naked exclusions). In other words, 
the approach prescribed as early as the initial stud-
ies in the late 1940s was to move away from per se 
rules to a rule of reason based on an assessment of 
the net effect of the practices in question14. Once 
again, the critical question was what the evalua-
tion criterion should be. 
The decisive contribution of Robert Bork (1966) 
was to propose a single criterion: the maximisation 
of consumer welfare15. Like Richard Posner’s view, 
according to which wealth maximisation must be 
the sole criterion for decision making in economic 
analysis of law (Kronman, 1980), Robert Bork pro-
poses the maximisation of consumer welfare as the 
13  As Kovacic (2020, p. 482) states in his critical as-
sessment of the academic literature devoted to 
the influence of the Second Chicago School on cu-
rrent us antitrust enforcement: “The modern us 
antitrust era is said to be a time when the Chicago 
School recast antitrust goals from an egalitarian 
perspective to a cramped concern with economic 
effects, especially prices paid by consumers.”
14  For an historical perspective on the use of the rule 
of reason in Antitrust, see Hovenkamp (2018).
15 At this point, referring to Melamed and Petit (2018) 
we should emphasise that the Supreme Court’s de-
cision to adopt the consumer welfare test should 
not be considered literally. While it refers to a 
Consumer Welfare prescription (Reiter v Sonoto-
ne, 442 us 330, 1979), the Sherman Act and compe-
tition policies as a whole are not prescriptive but 
proscriptive in nature. It is a matter of sanctioning 
anti-competitive practices that are not conducive 
to the maximisation of welfare. To quote Melamed 
and Petit (2018), competition law prohibits practi-
ces that create or perpetuate market power on a 
basis other than economic efficiency.
only criterion for competitive decision making16. 
This position is perfectly embodied by the Schor v 
Abbott Labs judgement of the 7th Cir. in 2007: “If 
a manufacturer cannot make itself better off by in-
juring consumers through lower output and high-
er prices, there is no role for antitrust law to play.”17
Nevertheless, Robert Bork’s interpretation 
constituted a sharp departure from the Su-
preme Court’s positions (Kirat & Marty, 2019). 
In Trans-Missouri Freight (1897), the us Supreme 
Court had interpreted the Sherman Act as protec-
tion of small dealers and worthy men18. In its 1945 
Alcoa ruling19, Judge Learned Hand had stated that 
antitrust law aims to “put an end to great aggrega-
tions of capital because of the hopelessness of the 
individual before them.” Only four years before 
Robert Bork’s article, the Supreme Court had reaf-
firmed in its Brown Shoe ruling20 that antitrust has 
to protect “small, locally owned businesses.”
In our second part, we will revisit the discus-
sion of this criterion both in terms of legitimacy 
and effects, but the consumer welfare standard 
is the cornerstone of what will become the more 
economic approach (or effects-based approach) in 
matters of competition rule enforcement.
The Supreme Court gradually adopted the ap-
proach advocated by the Second Chicago School 
in the second half of the 1970s with the GTE Syl-
vania21 (rule of reason, e.g., balance of effects) and 
16 The second Chicago School should not be seen as 
monolithic in terms of antitrust recommenda-
tions, either among its various promoters or over 
time. For example, Posner’s prescriptions may de-
viate significantly from those of Bork in matters 
of predatory pricing (Kovacic, 2020).
17 Schor v Abbott Labs, 457 F.3d 608, 611, 7th Cir., 
2007.
18 The United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 
166 us 290 (1897).
19 The United States v Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945).
20  Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v the United States, 370 us 294 
(1962).
21 Continental Television v GTE Sylvania, 433 us 36 
(1977)
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Sonotone (consumer welfare test22) judgments23. 
The appointment of William Baxter, by President 
Reagan, as head of the DoJ Antitrust Division 
(Assistant Attorney General), in the early 1980s 
consolidated this evolution24, which culminat-
ed in 2008 with the DoJ’s report on Single Firm 
Practices. In this regard, the Economic Report of 
the President published in February 2020 by the 
Trump Administration largely revives this model, 
as shown in chapter 6, “Evaluating the Risk of De-
clining Competition,” among other things (White 
House, 2020).
22 Note that the first mention of the consumer welfare 
test was made in 1975 in Justice Brennan’s dissen-
ting opinion on the National Bank Supreme Court 
decision (the United States v Citizens & Southern 
Nat’l Bank, 422 us 86 (1975)): “Correspondent 
banking, like other intra-industry interaction 
among firms or their top management, provides 
an opportunity both for the kind of education and 
sharing of expertise that ultimately enhances 
consumer welfare and for “understandings” that 
inhibit, if not foreclose, the rivalry that antitrust 
laws seek to promote.”
23 As Kovacic (2020) states, even if the Sylvania ruling 
cites Robert Bork’s and Richard Posner’s articles 
prominently, we should be cautious about the ac-
tual influence of academic literature on judges’ 
decisions. See Hutchinson (2017) for an in-depth 
analysis of the use of economics by Supreme Court 
justices. 
24 The 1982 DoJ merger control guidelines were a 
clear break from the 1968 guidelines. The aim was 
no longer “to preserve and promote market struc-
tures conducive to competition” but to prevent 
“harm to consumer welfare, generally in the form 
of price increases and output restrictions.” We 
should notice that a more economic approach gra-
dually spread throughout the us administration 
in the 1960s around merger control, as William-
son (2002) stated. However, this influence was not 
a Chicagoan one. As it is also the case for Antitrust 
enforcement, the Harvard School has played a 
significant role in such a shift. Oliver Williamson 
was Special Economic Assistant to the Head of the 
Antitrust Division of the us Department of Justice 
in 1966-67, while Donald Turner was Assistant At-
torney General for Antitrust (and the first PhD in 
economics to head the Antitrust Division).
A very gradual implementation of 
the effects-based approach in the 
eu between 2005 and 2017 
This section presents the implementation of the 
more economic approach in enforcing eu com-
petition law since 2005 to the detriment of the 
so-called forms-based one, e.g., the ordoliberal 
influenced one.
The issue of Bigness: Should  
the competition laws protect a given 
market structure?
The effects-based approach, in which consumer 
welfare was the only criterion to be used in an-
titrust matters, emerged latterly in the European 
Union compared to the us. Several factors may ex-
plain the shift that was initiated in the early 2000s. 
A first factor held to the search for soundness 
of the decisions in the face of the jurisdictional 
control exercised by the General Court (then the 
cfi, Court of First Instance). Indeed, the Court 
had annulled several Commission decisions (in 
the field of merger control25) because of a mani-
fest error of assessment in the economic reason-
ing (Marty, 2007). These three cancellations have 
raised several legal certainty issues about the firms 
and credibility of the Commission (Roda, 2019). 
The use of an economic approach is intended to 
enhance legal certainty for the authority in charge 
of enforcing competition rules, the aim being to 
minimise the risk of the decision overturned or 
reversed on appeal26.
25 See for instance: CJE/02/50 6 June 2002, Judgment 
of the Court of First Instance in Case T-342/99, Air-
tours v Commission. In this judgment, the Court 
of First Instance annulled a previous Commission 
decision declaring the merger between Airtours 
and First Choice incompatible with the common 
market.
26 The Commission enjoys a certain margin of appre-
ciation in complex economic assessments. The 
General Court has not entered the complexity of 
re-doing the economic analysis or revising the 
conclusions drawn therefrom by the Commission 
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A second factor was related to the transatlan-
tic debates at the beginning of the first decade of 
this century between us antitrust and eu compe-
tition policy. The Microsoft case gave rise to sever-
al debates induced by the (supposed or actual) eu 
consideration of competitors’ interests in antitrust 
litigation. The motto “The purpose of antitrust laws 
is to protect competition, not competitors27” was 
tantamount to blaming European competition pol-
icy for unduly favouring inefficient competitors to 
the detriment of consumers on the grounds of pre-
serving an effective competition structure on the 
market, which is conceived as effective rivalry be-
tween firms (Fox, 2003). This tension reflects both 
a discussion on the objectives assigned to competi-
tion law and the trade-off between the criterion of 
maximisation of consumer welfare and the crite-
rion of maximisation of total welfare, to which we 
shall return later. The effects-based approach was 
seen as the only way to enforce competition laws 
efficiently (Gerber, 2010).
Third, the focus on consumer welfare should 
not be separated from a broader movement to-
wards public management whose accountability is 
(oecd, 2019). However, the Court scrutinises com-
plex (economic) evidence in considerable detail: 
“Referring to the existence of a margin of discre-
tion does therefore not prevent the Court from ca-
rrying out a full and unrestricted review, in law 
and in fact.”
27 See Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 
429 us 477 (1977). Kovacic (2020, p. 479) insists on 
the importance of this statement in the current 
antitrust debate (see Khan, 2018a). “As amplified 
in later decisions, this phrase suggests that anti-
trust law is indifferent to the fate of individual 
firms unless their demise is linked to consumer 
detriment.” Such an approach is not exclusively 
shared by the Chicago School; it was also (at least 
partially) endorsed by the Harvard School (see 
Wu, 2018). According to W. Kovacic, although the 
Harvard School has endorsed a broader range of 
legitimate aims for antitrust enforcement (unlike 
the Chicago-based approach), it never has adop-
ted the “antitrust egalitarian approach” of the cu-
rrent new Brandeis movement.
based on results. New public management assigns 
to public policies an efficiency objective to which 
competition policy makes no exception. The max-
imisation of consumer welfare is part of this ob-
jective of guiding and monitoring results. We will 
insist on our conclusion on the emphasis us (and 
European) public debate place on the requirements 
of predictability, administrability, and credibility 
in matters of competition law enforcement.
The implementation of this approach within 
the eu was gradual. Essential features were already 
contained in Regulations 1/200328 and 139/200429 
(the latter on merger control) with distinct open-
ings for an efficiency-based defence. However, the 
real turning point was the publication in 2005 of 
the report produced by the group of experts ap-
pointed by DG Competition (eagcp, 2005). The 
latter was devoted to implementing a more eco-
nomic approach to Article 82 of the Treaty30, which 
deals with exclusionary or exploitative abuses (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2009).
The report’s advocates take up the criterion of 
consumer welfare maximisation by considering a 
derived criterion, the criterion of the efficient com-
petitor. The Commission’s February 2009 orienta-
tions on priorities regarding sanctioning abuses 
of dominant positions confirmed this inflexion31. 
The Commission insists on the importance that 
the implementation of the competition rules not 
result in undue protection of an economic oper-
ator whose productive efficiency would be lower 
than the one of the dominant firm (Marty, 2013). 
28 Council Regulation (ec) No 1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 on the implementation of the rules on compe-
tition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
29 Council Regulation (ec) No 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004 on the control of concentrations between un-
dertakings (the ec Merger Regulation).
30 This article is now Article 102 under the numbe-
ring of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into for-
ce in 2009.
31 Communication from the Commission, February 
2009, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the ec Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant un-
dertakings.
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In other words, the aim is to prevent decisions that 
would transfer welfare between consumers and 
competitors. As Roda (2018) points out, this in-
flexion has in no way been based on legislative de-
cisions; the eu Commission has made this change 
through its soft law texts.
This approach leads—at least in principle—to 
a greater emphasis on efficiency-based defence. It 
also amounts to departing from the formal prohi-
bition of specific practices for dominant operators. 
The effects-based approach provides for a case-by-
case assessment of the lawfulness of their market 
practices solely based on their net effect on con-
sumer welfare.
The Commission’s approach has, however, al-
ways been marked by a pragmatic stance. It has 
been a question not only of sanctioning practic-
es that foreclose a competitor as efficiently as the 
dominant operator but also those likely to have 
that effect. In other words, there is no need for the 
competitor to be effectively crowded out from the 
market. The fact that foreclosure is not effective 
does not exonerate the dominant operator from 
its liability. Pragmatically, the test may be adjust-
ed since small competitors cannot be reasonably 
expected to be as efficient as the dominant opera-
tor because of their economies of scale and scope. 
Thus, the reasonably equally efficient competitor 
test is used (Marty, 2013).
For instance, in margin squeeze cases where 
the vertically integrated dominant operator has 
a monopoly position in an upstream segment, 
the question is whether its downstream activity 
could be profitable if the same price conditions as 
those which the dominant operator imposed on 
its competitors operating in the same downstream 
market were applied to it. Nevertheless, the more 
economic approach implementation was not im-
mediate and effective by far. Two criticisms have 
been made. The first concerned the actual place 
given to the efficiency-based defence. The second 
was the reluctance of Luxembourg courts, which 
are responsible for judicial review, to endorse this 
shift in their case law.
The eu Court of Justice’s jurisprudence: 
From defending conventional decisional 
practice to the Intel case turnaround in 
September 2017 
The Court of Justice has been often criticised for 
being too attached to its past decades’ jurispru-
dence (Roda, 2018), which would have been an 
obstacle to a shift from formalism to effects on 
competition law enforcement (Petit, 2009). It 
would lead to sanctioning some of the strategies of 
dominant operators according to their form even 
without carrying out a balance of effects. The Intel 
judgment handed down in September 201732 was 
interpreted as a substantial shift away from the po-
sitions successively taken by the Commission and 
the General Court33.
It is not a matter here of detailing the case, but 
the Intel case is of particular interest to us in that it 
has crystallised the European debate. In 2009, the 
Commission fined Intel €1 billion (then the highest 
fine for antitrust practices on the European conti-
nent) for a combination of foreclosure practices to 
the detriment of its competitor, AMD, in the micro-
processors market. The wide range of sanctioned 
practices include retroactive loyalty rebates based 
on the share of each customer’s consumption of 
chips sold by the dominant operator. The ques-
tion was whether these rebates (which amounted 
to exclusivity rebates) were to be considered anti-
competitive and therefore sanctioned in their form 
32 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 Sep-
tember 2017, Intel Corp. v European Commission, 
case C-413/14P.
33 The 2012 Post Danmark judgment had already lar-
gely enshrined the primacy of the objective of effi-
ciency over choice, quality, or innovation: “Com-
petition on the merits may, by definition, lead to 
the departure from the market or the margina-
lisation of competitors that are less efficient and 
so less attractive to consumers from the point of 
view of, among other things, price, choice, quality 
or innovation” (§22).Judgment of the Court of Jus-
tice (Grand Chamber), 27 March 2012, Post Dan-
mark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, C-209/10.
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alone or whether an assessment of the effects had 
to be carried out to arrive at that conclusion.
In its 2009 decision, the Commission made 
this balance but only as a supplementary consider-
ation, holding that the very form of the rebates put 
in place by Intel constituted an abuse of a domi-
nant position. The eu General Court confirmed 
this appreciation in its 201434 ruling. However, in 
September 2017, the Court of Justice returned the 
case to the Court of First Instance, considering 
that the latter was nevertheless required to review 
the balance of effects carried out by the Commis-
sion. This judgment is subject to divergent inter-
pretations in Europeanist doctrine (Idot, 2018). 
For some scholars, it marks the Court’s endorse-
ment of the effects-based approach; for others, 
the Court’s position is essentially procedural: The 
General Court is required to consider in its ruling 
the issues raised by the parties.
Whatever the interpretation of the Intel judg-
ment, the Court of Justice has been gradually mov-
ing towards an effects-based approach through 
successive opinions of Advocates General, particu-
larly in the context of referrals for preliminary rul-
ings, which was, for example, the case for the AG 
Wahl’s opinion in the Intel decision of September 
2017 cited above. In his opinion35, he expressed a re-
quest for a preliminary ruling in a case of excessive 
pricing in the collective management of authors’ 
rights in Latvia (2017). His position also corre-
sponded to a consumer welfare focused logic36. 
34 General Court, 12 June 2014, Intel Corporation v 
Commission, case T-286/09.
35 Opinion of advocate general Wahl, 6 April 2017, 
case C-177/16, Biedrība ‘Autortiesību un komuni-
cēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru 
apvienība’ v Konkurences padome (Request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Su-
preme Court, Latvia)).
36 “At any rate, I am not sure that concepts such as 
‘equitable’ or ‘appropriate’ remuneration could 
be of great assistance to a competition authority. 
They seem to me as vague as the concepts of ‘ex-
cessive’ or ‘unfair’ prices” (§78).
The same applies to the conclusions of AG Wa-
thelet in the Orange Polska case related to the cal-
culation of financial penalties37. The AG insisted 
that the amount of the fine must be based on the 
assessment of the actual damage. For the latter, the 
General Court should have “assessed whether the 
effects of the infringement had been correctly es-
tablished by the Commission.” To do so, the Court 
had to consider all the circumstances of the case 
in its assessment, particularly the defendant’s ev-
idence and arguments. In other words, abuse of a 
dominant position cannot be assessed in abstracto.
Still following the opinion of the AG Wahl38, 
the Court of Justice, in a judgment on a request 
for a preliminary ruling in the case of MEO39, 
also consolidated the effects-based approach by 
specifying that the implementation of tariff dis-
crimination by a dominant operator cannot be 
regarded as anti-competitive in itself and that 
the—at least potential—anti-competitive ef-
fects had to be demonstrated. The mere existence 
of a difference in the treatment of trading partners 
is not enough to characterise abuse. Therefore, it is 
necessary “to carry out an examination of all the 
relevant circumstances to determine whether price 
discrimination produces or is likely to produce a 
competitive disadvantage.”
Can we conclude that the effects-based ap-
proach is hegemonic in both eu and us competition 
law enforcement? We will see in the second part 
that this finding can be subject to some nuances. 
37 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered 
on 21 February 2018, Orange Polska SA v Euro-
pean Commission, case C-123/16P.
38 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 20 
December 2017, meo – Serviços de Comunicações 
e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da Concorrência, 
case C-525/16.
39 CJEU, 19 April 2018, meo - Serviços de Comuni-
cações e Multimédia v Autoridade da Concorrên-
cia, aff. C-525/16
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From the Capitol to the Tarpeian 
rock: The consumer welfare criterion 
challenged 
In this second part, the aim is to focus successive-
ly on the criticisms that may have been levelled 
against the consumer welfare criterion in the the-
oretical field and then in recent decision-making 
practice. However, it may be possible to challenge 
its alternatives on the merits.
The consumer welfare test 
challenged both in the academic 
arena and in the digital economy 
The consideration of the consumer welfare criteri-
on as the exclusive basis for enforcing competition 
rules is the subject matter of a twofold criticism, 
which relates to its legitimacy in the academic 
sphere and tractability in litigations related to the 
digital economy.
Robert Bork’s interpretation of the 
Sherman Act criticised: Fifty years of 
doctrinal controversies 
The first criticism of the consumer welfare crite-
rion lies in its legitimacy considering the us an-
titrust legislative history. The concept of surplus 
was developed in economics by Marshall in his 
Principles of Economics published in 1890 at the 
very same time as the Sherman Act was enacted. 
Its promoters in the us Senate could not rely on 
such concepts. It was the economic power of big 
business that was targeted much more than its ef-
fects on prices. Such a reading is opposed to that of 
Bork (1966), for whom consumer welfare was the 
sole criterion underlying the legislator’s reasoning. 
Despite this historical evidence, Robert Bork had 
maintained in his Antitrust Paradox published in 
1978 that: “Congress designed the Sherman Act as 
a ‘consumer welfare prescription.”40
40  We will see that such a position, far from obvious 
in legal terms (see Melamed & Petit, 2018), has 
been endorsed by the us Supreme Court in its 1979 
Sonotone ruling.
Divergent positions were early articulated in 
the academic literature, which was the case of 
Lande (1982), for instance, for whom the Sherman 
Act was essentially aimed at unduly sanctioning 
welfare transfers linked to the exercise of econom-
ic power. Unlike Bork, Lande considers—in light 
of the legislative debates that preceded the enact-
ment of the Sherman Act—that the legislators’ 
objectives were less concerned with economic ef-
ficiency than with the protection of weaker parties 
in transactions with big companies, whether de-
pendent companies, farmers, or consumers. It was 
not about protecting a given market structure or 
seeking an efficiency objective but about counter-
balancing “abuses of dominance” in transactions.
Barak Orbach (2010) has pointed out the par-
adoxical nature of the consumer welfare test pro-
posed by Bork, which can cover both the consumer 
surplus and the total surplus41. This ambiguity is a 
serious matter42. The overall surplus measures the 
net effect of a practice by balancing its effects on 
the consumer and the producer. A practice that 
significantly increases output (through productiv-
ity gains) but results in a slight loss of welfare for 
the consumer in terms of price could be validated 
against the first criterion and rejected against the 
second. In other words, the consumer welfare test 
encompasses issues of welfare distribution. From 
a Chicago-style perspective, the primary concern 
must be efficiency. The distributional dimensions 
of welfare must be considered ex post through oth-
er public policy tools43. 
Moreover, the very notion of consumer wel-
fare involves such trade-offs: some consumers may 
win, and others may lose. The net effect alone is 
taken into account. A Kaldor Hicks criterion is at 
41  On this point, see also Blair and Sokol (2012).
42  According to Glick (2019b), “because the concept 
of [consumer welfare] is vacuous, it is not surpri-
sing that there is little agreement on its meaning 
or application in antitrust.”
43  Farrell and Katz (2006) present a clear statement 
of this view according to which a division of la-
bour is preferable: “A number of reasons suggests 
that antitrust policy is poorly suited as redistribu-
tion vehicle in comparison with various tax and 
subsidy schemes.” 
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stake and not a Pareto one44. Thus, welfare trans-
fers are assumed. However, the test does not lead 
to balance efficiency gains realised by the produc-
er and losses incurred by consumers, which is the 
core difference between a total welfare test and a 
consumer welfare one.
The ambiguity of Bork’s analysis is decisive 
here. The total welfare test focuses only on efficien-
cy, ignoring any consideration of the distribution 
of welfare. The consumer welfare test implies sep-
arating producer and consumer gains, which is as 
crucial in sanctioning anti-competitive practices 
as it is in merger control. As Wilson (2019) notes: 
“in merger analysis, the gains to the merging pro-
ducers do not count; only the effect on consumer 
prices is relevant.”
Beyond the criterion used to assess welfare, 
one of the most recent and sharpest criticisms 
of Robert Bork’s approach was made by Lina Khan 
in her “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox” published in 
2017 in the Yale Law Journal. Lina Khan’s work is 
emblematic of the neo-structuralist movement, 
also named the new Brandeis movement45. Accord-
ing to Khan (2018b), 
The Chicago focus on ‘consumer welfare’ […] 
has warped American’s antimonopoly regime, by 
leading both enforcers and courts to focus mainly 
on promoting ‘efficiency,’ on the theory that this will 
result in low prices for consumers. The fixation on 
efficiency, in turn, has largely blinded enforcers to 
many of the harms caused by undue market power 
including on workers, suppliers, innovators, and in-
dependent entrepreneurs—all harms that Congress 
intended for the antitrust laws to prevent. (p. 132)
Lastly, it should be noted that Bork’s inter-
pretation of this criterion prevents any sanction 
of undue transfers of welfare compared with a 
44  However, these two criteria are challenged on 
their theoretical grounds by welfare economists 
(Glick, 2019b).
45  Former Woodrow Wilson’s advisor from 1912 to 
1916, Louis Brandeis, was appointed to the us Su-
preme Court in 1916. Figurehead of the associatio-
nalist movement (Berk, 2009), Brandeis was ve-
hemently opposed to the then conventional view 
according to which bigness is a necessary evil to 
achieve efficiency because of scale economies.
hypothetical situation of perfect competition (i.e., 
if the firms were price-takers) and does not protect 
the competitive process itself. Therefore, it departs 
significantly from the decisional practice of us an-
titrust until the 1970s and the ordoliberal founda-
tions of European competition policy.
Consumer welfare may also be challenged on 
theoretical grounds. Firstly, it does not resolve sit-
uations where some consumers gain from certain 
practice and some others lose. Therefore, it as-
sumes that individual utilities can be aggregated 
(Glick, 2018). Second, this criterion is based on a 
substantial rationality model that can be discussed 
in light of the contributions of behavioural eco-
nomics (Stucke, 2007). However, it is vital to sep-
arate the effects-based approach, in general, from 
the exclusive focus on allocative efficiency, in par-
ticular. The first one is not specific to the Chicago 
School. As Kovacic (2020) underlines, the modern 
Harvard School also endorses such approaches. 
The Chicago School corresponds to the second 
one. Still, such an approach focuses on Robert 
Bork’s views and is even more restrictive than 
those of other Chicagoan scholars. As Kovacic 
(2020, p. 485) states, “The Chicago School supplies 
an easily recognized villain, and Robert Bork is 
its sinister mastermind.” Concisely, the two main 
challenged characteristics of this approach are i) 
its exclusive focus on allocative efficiency and ii) 
its ambiguity between consumer welfare and total 
welfare criteria.
Is the consumer welfare criterion still 
suitable for our digital economy? 
The influence of the Second Chicago School was 
spotlighted in the Stigler Center report on digi-
tal platforms (Stigler Center for the Study of the 
Economy and of the State, 2019) mainly for blam-
ing the noninterventionist bias of us antitrust en-
forcers. Even if the specificity of the Chicagoan 
prescriptions in this respect may be questionable, 
it remains that the report challenges the limits of 
the consumer welfare criterion in matters of com-
petition law enforcement in the digital sector.
Competition damage—as well as consumers’ 
damage—is not limited to a reduction of surpluses. 
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For instance, how to capture the consequences of 
a reduction in the variety of goods and services 
available to consumers in the consumer welfare 
criterion? Or how to consider the effects of fore-
closing even a less efficient competitor if it causes 
the disappearance from the market of a supplier 
whose products were distinct from the domi-
nant firm’s ones in terms of quality and privacy? 
In the area of mergers control, the acquisition of 
WhatsApp by Facebook is emblematic of this is-
sue. The damage does not come from eliminating 
an offer or a higher price but from reducing pri-
vacy guarantees. Can the damage caused to con-
sumers, in general, be estimated knowing that 
their preferences may direct them towards one or 
another product? Therefore, the disappearance of a 
supplier may damage competition, which this sin-
gle aggregate criterion does not capture.
The activities of big firms in the digital econo-
my today raise significant competition concerns. 
However, it is difficult to consider that they di-
rectly harm end-users or result in allocative inef-
ficiencies. The business models of platforms are 
characterised by zero price models (or even nega-
tive prices in some cases when subsidies for specif-
ic equipment and services are included) and very 
high rates of innovation (Marty & Warin, 2020). 
The consumer does not have to lose out—certain-
ly in the short term and possibly, even in the long 
term—as long as market positions remain contest-
able, i.e., the competitive and technological turbu-
lence makes the seemingly monopolistic positions 
of the moment precarious.
However, considering that the economic his-
tory of the last twenty years in the digital sector 
has no reason to repeat itself indefinitely, it is to 
be feared that competition will be significantly 
damaged. Even if today’s dominant companies 
had once supplanted the past dominant firms (Ya-
hoo!, MySpace), the technological and economic 
conditions have dramatically changed. Once it is 
assumed that barriers to market entry are inexora-
bly increasing, today’s monopolies may still be in 
place tomorrow.
In digital markets, barriers to entry may be due 
to the investments required, the accumulated data 
(and the controlled data flows), the algorithms 
developed, and the data processing capacities, but 
also the acquired position of a market gatekeeper 
or keystone player in an ecosystem (mobile oper-
ating system, digital industrial platform, cloud 
computing platform). What then are the competi-
tive risks? The first one is the risk of predatory be-
haviour. The gains assured to consumers may only 
be short-term in nature. As soon as consumers are 
captive, i.e., locked in a silo, the platform may in-
crease its prices or reduce innovation pace. There 
is, therefore, the potential for long-term damage 
through the development of silo effects. Consum-
ers will be all the more dependent as they will have 
strong incentives to opt for single-homing, and 
their ability to exit the platform will be hindered 
by switching costs (whether in monetary terms or 
in loss of contents).
This dependency pattern does not only concern 
individual consumers. It can be extended to trad-
ing partners, i.e., the complementors of the digi-
tal ecosystem. The issue is twofold. It pertains to 
possible exclusionary abuses and exploitative ones. 
For the latter, it is no longer an issue of mark-up 
but an issue of mark-down. The keystone player 
may exploit its monopsony power to the detriment 
of their complementors. In such a context, the rel-
evancy of the consumer welfare criterion may be 
challenged46.
Complementors may be in a position of eco-
nomic and technological dependence (Smor-
to, 2018). These include independent vendors in 
marketplaces or application developers in mobile 
ecosystems. They are “attracted” to the platforms 
through contractual incentives or the provision of 
boundary resources (lines of code, data, interop-
erability protocols). However, these contractual 
46  Yet this point is being debated. While a large body 
of academic literature highlights the difficulty of 
the effects-based approach in dealing with situa-
tions of monopsonist market power (in the plat-
forms sector, on certain segments of the labour 
market, among others), these considerations have 
been taken into account in certain m&a transac-
tions in the us (in the context of the takeover of 
Essendant by Staples, for example). See Sycamore 
Partners II, L.P.; Staples, Inc; and Essendant Inc., 
FTC, file N°181-0180, 28 January 2019.
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terms (such as data access) make them economi-
cally and technically dependent on the platform. 
The transactions between keystone players and 
their complementors are cooperative by nature but 
intrinsically unbalanced. 
Damage to competition can be damage to a 
trading partner. From a French typology, it would 
be possible to consider that we are dealing here 
only with restrictive practices and not with anti- 
competitive practices. It would be a question of pe-
tit droit de la concurrence and not grand droit de 
la concurrence. The former deals only with con-
tractual imbalance-related issues and not, as the 
latter does, with the effects on consumer welfare 
(e.g., effects on the whole market). The relationship 
between platforms and their complementors illus-
trates the issue of abuse of economic dependence 
(Bougette et al., 2019). Although this concept does 
not exist in eu competition law, it can be found in 
French, Italian, German, Portuguese, Greek, and, 
since spring 2019, Belgian legislations47.
The European Regulation on Platform-to- 
Business Relations adopted in June 2019 illus-
trates the seriousness of these issues. It shows that 
the dependency of complementors can induce a 
certain number of competitive damages that can-
not be fully reflected in consumer welfare. These 
may include discriminatory access to a platform 
with critical infrastructure features (a platform 
in a gatekeeper position can be seen as an essen-
tial facility), which may involve unfair access not 
only in relation to competitors in a downstream 
or related market but also in transactional terms. 
Unfair conditions may be imposed on comple-
mentors. The issue is then not only fairness but 
also equal access to the market for companies 
(both complementors and competitors). Compe-
tition as a process may then be at stake.
On the one hand, competition is being damaged 
by restricting consumers’ freedom of choice. On 
the other, harm to competition can take the form 
of harm to innovation. To the extent that access to 
47  For an in-depth analysis of dominant digital plat-
forms’ capacity to abuse their economic power at 
the expense of their trading partners through un-
balanced transaction terms, see Monnerie (2019).
technological paths can be closed off by the plat-
form, it can induce damage to dynamic efficiency, 
which was the sense of the damage to innovation 
put forward in the Microsoft case 16 years ago. In 
the same way, as soon as the platform “controls” 
the innovation dynamics of its complementors, it 
can reduce the incentives and capacities to devel-
op disruptive innovations (which can disrupt the 
platform) to make only incremental innovations 
possible (Marty & Warin, 2020). These are all the 
more useful for the keystone player in a digital eco-
system as they make it possible to perpetuate data 
flows and address the “non-consumption” issue.
In contrast, disruptive innovations are much 
less likely in this context, as the monopoly has no 
interest in replacing itself. Despite its investments, 
it would still benefit from the same rent. There-
fore, the damage to innovation can damage the 
pace of innovation and composition (radical ver-
sus incremental). Given the market power that the 
platforms enjoy and their potentially irreversible 
nature, it is not a matter of departing from the cri-
terion of consumer welfare but instead of adding 
specific considerations that are more directly relat-
ed to the ordoliberal tradition.
Firstly, this may involve reinvigorating the con-
cept of the dominant operator’s special responsi-
bility regarding the competition (Sauter, 2019). 
Because of its intrinsic strength (and the natural 
tipping tendencies of these markets), the domi-
nant operator must ensure that its decisions do not 
bring about irreparable foreclosure of competitors 
who may not be able to compete on the merits. 
Secondly, some justification for imposing obliga-
tions might fall within the scope of asymmetrical 
regulation of competition, which could be the case 
of guaranteeing access to some of their assets on 
the ground of essential facility doctrine (or access 
to interface protocols) or the right to data porta-
bility. Such a special responsibility could also be 
expressed in terms of platforms’ “technological” or 
“competitive” neutrality.
Therefore, it is not a question of addressing 
damage to consumer welfare but tackling potential 
harm to effective competition. By returning to the 
ordoliberal approach, it is the process of competi-
tion that must be preserved. From this perspective, 
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the lawfulness of dominant firms’ practices must 
no longer be assessed by their net effect on con-
sumer welfare.
To some extent, although the us and Euro-
pean contexts are complicated to compare, the 
Neo-Brandeisian trend also endorses the logic 
of widening the spectrum of competitive harms 
that could be considered alongside the criterion of 
consumer welfare (Newman, 2019). However, the 
range of damages is considerably more compre-
hensive: decreased potential for the development 
of start-ups (the notion of killing zone), increased 
inequalities, privacy problems, growing fake news, 
among others. Therefore, it is more a matter of 
regulating the economic power of specific firms 
than a matter of defending competition. Ultimate-
ly, the standard effective competition proposed by 
Maurice Stucke and Marshall Steinbaum (2018) is 
closest to the approach defended within the eu. In 
the same vein, Wu’s “protection of competition” 
test echoes the ordoliberal prescription according 
to which competition laws must protect the com-
petition process itself and not its result: efficiency 
(Wu, 2018).
It is also necessary to stress the convergence 
of different simultaneous trends, which call into 
question, if not the criterion of the consumer’s 
welfare itself, then at least its role as an exclusive 
consideration in enforcing the competition rules. 
We have already addressed these points above, but 
we propose to group them here in as a summary.
First, criticism of the consumer welfare criteri-
on underlies a critique of the Chicago School. We 
have seen that it is far-reaching to associate the 
more economic approach with this single criteri-
on, especially with this single school. Hovenkamp 
(2005) described the antitrust consensus in no way 
as a consensus around the Chicago School as it ex-
isted in the 1960s. The dna of the American anti-
trust doctrine undoubtedly exhibits a double helix, 
and the courts do not base their decisions on text-
books from the 1960s (Kovacic, 2007). As Kovacic 
(2020) clearly states, the influence of the Chicago 
School on actual antitrust enforcement is often ex-
aggerated in academic literature. The effects-based 
approach should not be reduced to Robert Bork’s 
analysis, and the Chicago School had more play as 
a catalyst for the economic turn of the us antitrust 
enforcement than as a unique compass. The Har-
vard School had also initiated such a turn.
However, the adequacy between the criterion of 
consumer welfare, the effects-based approach, and 
Chicago-style prescriptions reflects two trends that 
have been very strong in recent decades. On the 
one hand, it is a question of taking one branch of 
economics—and one branch alone—and making 
it the alpha and omega of economic analysis. Many 
approaches, often complementary to the latter, are 
rejected outside the scope of the discussion. On 
the other, the Chicago approach has been less and 
less seen as an approach prescribing a case-by-case 
balance of effects but as increasingly per se rules 
by considering certain practices (especially verti-
cal ones) as pro-efficient48. The outcome may be an 
under-enforcement of competition rules. The 
burden of proof lies exclusively on the complai-
nants, and its standard is increasingly high. Such 
an approach is problematic since it is conside-
red—contrary to Easterbrook (1984)—that a false 
negative decision can be more costly than a false 
positive one.
Secondly, digital economy evolutions question 
the reasoning that focuses on allocative efficiency 
alone, statically, and based on partial equilibrium. 
Three consequences are to be taken into account. 
48  For a striking illustration of such tendencies, see 
the draft published by the ftc and the DoJ regar-
ding the Vertical Merger Guidelines (DoJ-FTC, 
2020, p. 9): “Because vertical mergers combine 
complementary economic functions and elimina-
te contracting frictions, they have the potential to 
create cognizable efficiencies that benefit compe-
tition and consumers. Vertical mergers bring to-
gether assets used at different levels in the supply 
chain to make a final product. A single firm able 
to coordinate how these assets are used may be 
able to streamline production, inventory mana-
gement, or distribution, or create innovative pro-
ducts in ways that would have been hard to achie-
ve through arm’s length contracts.” Economides 
et al. (2020, p. 7) also insist on the adverse permis-
sive effects the implementation of this draft might 
produce through its “misplaced emphasis on the 
elimination of double marginalization as an effi-
ciency justification for vertical mergers.”
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First, competition turbulences in digital markets 
may not be as severe as fifteen years ago (Marty & 
Warin, 2020). As noted above, the growing impor-
tance of barriers to entry means that the contest-
ability of markets is less and less assured. Second, 
platform markets are characterised by additional 
difficulties in delineating relevant markets and as-
sessing the effects on all business sides, which does 
not invalidate the consumer welfare criterion, but 
requires recognition of the increasing risks of false 
negatives. Third, the development of these digital 
markets itself legitimately increases the scope of 
competitive concerns. Much of the debate around 
hipster antitrust focuses on the necessity to con-
sider non-economic or at least very general dimen-
sions (employment, inequalities) in competition 
authorities’ decisions.
Although the parallel is not necessarily relevant, 
it could be argued that each public policy tool must 
have a specific objective and that bringing antitrust 
to address macroeconomic objectives may at best 
have sub-optimal results. This “Tinbergen rule” 
should not mean that the competition judge consid-
ers broader dimensions, but it does mean, as we will 
see in our last subsection, that he should then bal-
ance conflicting objectives for which it is difficult to 
find common equivalents. For instance, how could 
a competition judge arbitrate between the interests 
of consumers and the interests of employees?
However, this enlargement can also take place 
within the competition policy itself. The develop-
ment of the platform economy integrates into the 
competitive reasoning concerns that fall under 
other branches of law. This is the case of consum-
er law since the users of the platforms are private 
individuals, which is also the case of contract law. 
Platforms involve numerous vertical contractual 
restrictions, which concern restrictive practices 
(le petit droit de la concurrence) and competition 
law enforcement (le grand droit de la concurrence). 
Contractual imbalances raise concerns not only 
for the parties concerned but also for competition. 
They may give rise to exclusionary abuses, ex-
ploitative abuses, and abuses of economic depen-
dence that competition law must (and can) address 
(Bougette et al., 2019). 
Such concerns echo the reflections, particu-
larly in the context of merger control, about the 
notion of trading partner welfare. Contractors 
dependent on platforms are not protected any 
more than competitors in the past, but barriers 
to accessing the market may harm the consumer 
regarding freedom of choice and the diversity of 
options available. Similarly, if exploitative abuses 
are committed, trading partners can no longer 
invest, thus benefiting consumers. Furthermore, 
if the keystone player controls the technological 
trajectory of its complementors, it can hinder any 
disruptive innovation and lock its complementors 
into innovations that reinforce their (and consum-
ers’) dependence on it. 
The last area of law at stake is the right to pro-
tection of personal life (privacy). The platforms 
involve constant trade-offs between the transfer 
of personal data and the provision of services. A 
free service can be paid for by a disproportionate 
extraction of personal data. The consumer may 
not be aware of this (the so-called privacy myo-
pia). Simultaneously, such extraction may offer a 
data advantage to the dominant player against its 
(potential) competitors. It may create a barrier to 
entry. The long-term effects of this asymmetric 
data extraction can reduce the market’s contest-
ability and eventually its foreclosure, which con-
stitutes a particular form of predation for which 
we must develop tools to balance the two effects. 
The case of Facebook’s takeover of WhatsApp is a 
good illustration of these trade-offs between effi-
ciency and privacy. In addition, it made it possible 
to “deconstruct” the notion of consumer by op-
posing consumers who did not value the protec-
tion of personal data (and who could therefore use 
Facebook Messenger) and those who agreed to pay 
the price to access the service in exchange for the 
protection of their data.
The worst criterion except  
for all the others? 
Newman (2019), commenting on Hovenkamp’s 
2005 book The Antitrust Enterprise, indicated that 
antitrust seemed to have reached the equivalent of 
the end of history with the effects-based approach 
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until a decade ago. Within this perspective, the 
origin and termination of all analyses lay in mea-
suring prices and output49. In other words, alloc-
ative efficiency is how practices are evaluated and 
their sole criterion of assessment.
While this criterion has apparent limitations, 
it has advantages. It provides a single standard 
against which practices can be measured and 
achieves the objectives of legal certainty. The lat-
ter relates to the clarity of the rule, the limited ap-
plication of discretionary aspects, and finally, the 
predictability of its enforcement. Finally, adopting 
a single criterion makes it possible to avoid arbi-
tration between qualitative and often conflicting 
objectives. The analysis developed by Melamed 
and Petit (2018) as a (reasoned) defence of the 
consumer welfare criterion goes in this direction. 
Consumer welfare provides a legitimate criterion 
insofar as it does not carry underlying values or 
political choices50.
Similarly, from public choice, a one-dimension-
al criterion is more difficult for interest groups to 
manipulate (Dorsey et al., 2018). The application 
of the test is predictable, which enhances the le-
gal security of operators and limits the risk of op-
portunistic lawsuits that are particularly costly for 
defendants51. 
49  Focusing on prices and outputs alone removes any 
quality dimension and can lead to false negatives 
in platform markets operating under zero-price 
models. Nevertheless, more sophisticated ver-
sions of the consumer welfare criterion incorpo-
rate dimensions such as quality or diversity of 
supply. These non-monetary variables are conver-
ted into prices as part of the analysis. For instan-
ce, such an approach has been implemented in the 
airline industry (see Keating et al., 2013).
50  This position can nevertheless be discussed in li-
ght of the debates to which it gives rise. The choice 
of a given economic method or tool cannot be re-
garded as neutral or purely technical. To this end, 
one should think of the debates in the us between 
technical antitrust and political antitrust. While 
it is already difficult to consider competition law 
to be neutral, its implementation invariably in-
volves choice and political priorities.
51 This point can also be discussed concerning the 
inner efficiency of antitrust procedures. The 
We present above some criteria proposed in the 
academic literature. Do they constitute alternative 
or complementary standards to consumer welfare? 
It seems that the second option should be dismis-
sed because of its imperfections. It nevertheless 
captures essential dimensions that the former 
cannot.
A first criterion could be the consumer free-
dom of choice standard. Any “conduct that ar-
tificially limits the natural range of choices in 
the marketplace” (Lande, 2001, p. 504) would be 
anti-competitive. A second criterion can consist 
of renewing—with the original 1890 legislative in-
tent—and searching for conciliation for multiple 
purposes, such as preserving a dispersed indus-
try structure or fairness in economic transactions 
(Wilson, 2019). However, it raises the difficulty in 
arbitrating among these objectives52. A third cri-
terion can be the protection of the competitive 
process. Competition policy should sanction all 
practices that can impair the latter (Werden, 2014).
This brief overview shows that the consumer 
welfare criterion criticisms are more likely to call 
for an adjustment of the criterion than for its pos-
sible abandonment. When it comes to the abuse of 
a dominant position, it is, in any case, a question 
of assessing a potential effect on competition. An 
effects-based approach is necessary; the consumer 
more economic (i.e., effects-based) approach in-
volves collecting and processing considerable vo-
lumes of data by defendants. Simpler—i.e., more 
formal—rules could limit these costs. Let us add 
a dimension: the data required are mainly price 
and sales data of the incriminated dominant un-
dertaking. They often do not allow an assessment 
of the impact of the practices on consumer wel-
fare. Here we come to a paradox already pointed 
out by Bosco (2013): the more economic approach 
is mainly reflected in an analysis of dominant 
operators’ costs in predatory pricing cases rather 
than in any measure of consumer welfare.
52  us political and theoretical debates tend to add ad-
ditional goals to these objectives such as income 
inequality reductions or job protection. The se-
cond issue is related to the monopsonist power (or 
oligopsonist one) in specific job market segments 
such as the high-tech one. The first one was rai-
sed, among others, by Khan and Vaheesan (2017).
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surplus criterion is constantly called upon to play 
a central role, if only because of its tractability53. 
Nonetheless, it should not be an exclusive and 
overly restrictive test in its operationalisation by 
unreasonably raising the standard of proof and 
placing it on the complainants54. Therefore, the 
risk is being exposed to false negatives and tipping 
towards pro-trust antitrust that constitutes both 
economic and political risks (Marty & Kirat, 2018).
Let us recall one of the lessons of original 
neo-liberalism: the concentration of econom-
ic power—if no longer reversible—involves two 
risks for democracy. The first is the risk of po-
litical power capture by private economic pow-
ers (we could add to this) when platforms play a 
central role in access to information, the risk of 
manipulating public opinion, whether voluntary 
or not55). The second risk is that the concentration 
of economic power will trigger a backlash from 
the political power in terms of regulation, which 
should not come as a surprise: this was already 
the case in 1912 in the us with the presidential 
debates between Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson 
(see Crane, 2015). The concentration of econom-
ic power posits the political question of the mo-
dalities of regulation between Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian approaches (Pasquale, 2018). The 
53  Wilson (2019) insists on three favourable charac-
teristics associated with the consumer welfare 
criterion: predictability, administrability, and 
credibility.
54  Crémer et al. (2019, p. 4) propose for digital mar-
kets to “impose on the incumbent the burden of 
proof for showing the pro-competitiveness of its 
conduct.”
55  The question is beyond the scope of this reflection, 
but the accumulation of personal data combined 
with the isolation of consumers in vertical silos 
raises serious concerns about the social control of 
individuals. As such, the strategies—economica-
lly rational and efficient—of the Internet’s big fir-
ms can be questioned from the angle of political 
desirability (Pasquale, 2013). In this artificial in-
telligence era, do we wish to endow the powers—
whether private or public—with such tools of 
social control, even if they bring unquestionable 
efficiency gains (Pasquale, 2018)?
characteristic of the 1930s neoliberal approach 
was to lean towards the former.
Similarly, the contestation of the consumer 
welfare test—or the restrictive use made of it—
should not call for implementing a discretionary 
antitrust that could lead either to a neo-classical 
legal thought (reactionary antitrust) or to a return 
to an obsolete and impractical structuralist model. 
An antitrust that would target the Bigness itself, 
which would champion dismantling in the absence 
of demonstration of damage to the consumer, 
would cause several damages. First, concentration 
as such occurs naturally for the sectors of activi-
ty concerned. Second, it does not in itself pose a 
problem as long as competitors and consumers 
can exert countervailing pressure. Third, eventual 
dismantling—if practicable—would impose social 
costs that are difficult to anticipate and could re-
sult in significant losses of efficiency, which does 
not mean that structural remedies should be ex-
cluded per se, but that they should be subjected to a 
cost-benefit analysis, of which consumer welfare is 
an essential dimension.
Nevertheless, many considerations taken into 
accoun in the context of us antitrust make sense 
in the European context as soon as they are accli-
matised to it. The standard of effective competition 
proposed by Steinbaum and Stucke (2018) or that 
of the defence of the competition process support-
ed by Wu (2018) are not far from the ordoliberal 
logic. For instance, Tim Wu (2018) suggests that 
practices should be weighed against their compat-
ibility with competition on the merits. A strategy 
that has the effect of hindering or distorting the 
competitive process would then be considered 
anti-competitive. These dimensions echo the 
case-law concept established by the Court of Jus-
tice of the dominant operator’s special responsibil-
ity. The implementation of this approach had been 
made narrower by the so-called more economic 
approach (of which the criterion of consumer wel-
fare was the keystone).
These current developments in both the 
competitive, political, and theoretical fields sug-
gest that the European Commission builds the 
model that may constitute an attractive com-
promise. Without disavowing the benefits of the 
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effects-based approach, the latter maintains an or-
doliberal conception of competition (a process to 
be protected for itself and possibly against itself). 
The eu Court of Justice and the eu Commission 
increasingly consider dimensions that had been 
progressively marginalised, such as transparen-
cy, fairness, or loyalty (Petit, 2018), and retain a 
plurality of objectives among which efficiency is 
an essential but not exclusive component. These 
objectives are straightforward: the protection of 
free, undistorted competition on the merits. The 
criterion of consumer welfare makes it possible 
to reflect—at least partially—the last objective but 
needs to be supplemented by further analysis for 
the first two. Competition need not be reduced to 
its result—e.g., allocative efficiency—. It is a tool 
of discovery in the Hayekian sense of the term, an 
instrument of discovery of knowledge in society, 
and finally—and this point is essential—a vector of 
dispersion of economic and political power. There 
can be no efficiency without free competition and 
no democracy without free competition.
Discussion 
As a discussion, we might consider two issues. 
The first one deals with the potential effects of 
implementing a “protection of competition” crite-
rion. The second one is related to a quite surpris-
ing defence of a total welfare criterion, presented 
by Wilson (2019), as an alternative for antitrust 
enforcement.
If the criterion of consumer welfare is likely to 
remain the cornerstone of the implementation of 
competition rules, it appears that it cannot be the 
only criterion, as it does not capture all the dam-
age to competition. Is the concept of damage to 
competition a good alternative? The notion of the 
dominant operator’s special responsibility can be 
an interesting compromise, more satisfying than 
truly hipster style approaches as a return to non-
faulty monopolist rules and eventually advocacy 
for structural remedies such as dominant platform 
dismantling56 or “antitrust lawsuits to unwind pre-
viously completed mergers” involving tech giants 
56  See Khan (2019) in the case of e-commerce platfor-
ms.
(Kovacic, 2020, p. 487). However, how should it be 
implemented in practice? It implies specific duties 
for dominant operators, such as mandatory access 
to data or platforms (Chaiehloudj, 2020). 
On the one hand, it remains essential to avoid 
excessively asymmetrical competition regula-
tion models and, on the other hand, to guarantee 
non-discriminatory practices regarding access to 
or carrying obligations for third party offers or 
contents. Melamed and Petit (2019) exemplify the 
scope of these obligations: “the promotion of in-
ter and intra platforms rivalry would require the 
imposition of positive obligations— must carry 
requirements, mandatory api sharing, data por-
tability measures—on platform-based firms [...]” 
(p. 765). It should be noted that this raises anoth-
er essential legal issue: Should competition law 
merely sanction certain practices, or should it 
impose market behaviour? In other words, how 
can such an essential facility doctrine be managed 
effectively?
Surprisingly, the consumer welfare criterion is 
also challenged by the total welfare one. We have 
noted that Robert Bork’s conception was ambig-
uous. His consumer welfare may be conceived as 
total welfare. According to Hovenkamp (2019): 
Bork did not use the term ‘consumer welfare’ 
in the same way that most people use it today. For 
Bork, ‘consumer welfare’ referred to the sum of the 
welfare, or surplus, enjoyed by both consumers and 
producers. Bork referred to consumer welfare as 
‘merely another term for the wealth of the nation.’ 
(p. 101) 
Wilson (2019) considers this total welfare 
criterion can be relevant as soon as we assign to 
competition laws the sole purpose of promoting 
economic efficiency. Such a focus on total surplus 
makes sense from a Chicagoan perspective. As 
soon as competition law must cope with efficiency, 
it is out of the scope to consider welfare distribu-
tion, as the consumer welfare criterion imposes to 
do so. It is only a matter of expanding the size of 
the pie (see, for instance, Williamson, 1968). 
The Second Chicago School rejects distribu-
tional considerations outside the scope of econom-
ics. The reduction of welfare inequalities pertains 
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to the sphere of political preferences; it should be 
addressed through taxation57. In the same vein, 
the increasing concentration of market power has 
both a potential impact on efficiency (by deterring 
potential competitors from investing and from in-
novating) but also on the robustness of democracy 
(the higher the financial risks associated with ad-
verse political choices, the higher the capacity and 
the incentives to invest for exerting an influence 
on political power). The regulation of lobbying ac-
tivities or the reform of campaign financing can 
address the capacity to convert economic power in 
a political one (Shapiro, 2018) but not the private 
interests to capture public regulation.
According to Wilson (2019), adopting this cri-
terion could lead to more favourable decisions if, 
for example, a merger would bring significant ef-
ficiency gains58 in industries characterised by high 
levels of fixed costs59. Among the arguments pre-
sented in defence of a total welfare criterion is the 
possibility of considering multi-market effects. A 
transaction may increase the market power on one 
segment and have positive effects on another. Such 
an operation may also transfer innovations from 
one segment to another and, by doing so, may gen-
erate dynamic efficiencies.
It, therefore, appears that the debate over the 
criteria that should guide the competitive deci-
sion requires a re-examination of the criterion of 
consumer welfare, as it stems from Robert Bork’s 
work. Two avenues of evolution are therefore to 
be considered. As Christine Wilson (2019) does, 
the first is to question the relative interest in con-
sidering the total welfare test, which is, after all, 
very close to the consumer welfare test as defined 
by Bork. The second is to revive the European 
57  However, Piketty (2013) has demonstrated that in-
come and capital inequalities significantly impact 
potential economic growth.
58  Christine Wilson (2019) also quotes the case of 
the 1986 Canadian Competition Act that opens the 
door to considering a broader perimeter of effi-
ciency gains in mergers (sec. 96(1)).
59  However, while such a transaction generates effi-
ciency gains, it also increases market power and 
thus reduces the incentives to make consumers 
benefit from these gains (Rainelli, 2006).
tradition based on ordoliberalism, from which the 
eu has only recently begun to depart. Moreover, 
by combining an effects-based approach and con-
sidering the dominant operator’s special responsi-
bility for maintaining effective competition, this 
approach makes it possible to reconcile different 
competition policy objectives without giving way 
to a structuralist approach. It is always a question 
of balancing several values60, which inexorably 
gives room for discretion. 
However, two arguments must be taken into 
consideration. First, the criterion of consumer 
welfare also involves such trade-offs, even if only 
between different consumers. Second, an ordolib-
eral approach seems exceptionally reasonable in 
an economy where the digital sector is increasing-
ly important. It is characterised by three features 
that argue in favour of this approach: the increas-
ing and perhaps irreversible market concentra-
tion, the need to ensure the sustainability of the 
innovation-based competition model, and coping 
with the unpredictability of market dynamics. 
From this perspective, the criterion of protecting 
the competitive process makes more sense than 
ever (de Streel, 2020).
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